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I. Introduction
In spite of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ford v.
Wainwright, 1 Atkins v. Virginia, 2 Panetti v. Quarterman, 3 and
Hall v. Florida, 4 persons with severe psychosocial and intellectual
disabilities continue to be given death sentences, in some cases
leading to actual execution. 5 Although the courts have been aware
1. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
2. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3. 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
4. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
5. Before Atkins, at least thirty-five mentally retarded defendants were
executed in the years after the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER,
HUM. RTS. WATCH, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION 2 (2001) (explaining that the exact number of mentally
retarded individuals on death row has not been quantified, but it may be as high
as 300). On the “back stories” of several cases in Texas in which individuals with
intellectual disabilities have been executed since the decision in Atkins, see Lane
Florsheim, How Texas Keeps Putting the Intellectually Disabled on Death Row,
NEW REPUBLIC (May 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117765/ deathpenalty-mentally-disabled-how-do-states-keep-doing-it (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)
(describing how mentally disabled individuals such as Marvin Wilson, a murderer
with an IQ of sixty-one, are executed based on faulty science that the state uses
to determine mental competency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). See also Lincoln Caplan, Last Chance for Warren Lee Hill, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2013), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/last-chance-forwarren-lee-hill/?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (relaying the story of a mentally
retarded individual in Georgia who was sentenced to death under circumstances
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of this for decades—dating back at least to the infamous Ricky
Rector case in Arkansas 6—these base miscarriages of justice
continue and show no sign of abating. Scholars have written
clearly and pointedly on this issue (certainly, more frequently since
the Atkins decision in 2002), 7 but little has changed. And the
stakes in this should be clear to all: “In some form or fashion,
evidence of mental state is pertinent to virtually every capital
case.” 8
This is not a surprise to anyone in the criminal justice system,
as the treatment of persons with mental disabilities has long been
a scandal. When I titled a recent book, Mental Disability and the
Death Penalty: The Shame of the States, 9 I did so consciously,
because we should all be profoundly ashamed of a system that
shames persons with disabilities as well as those who advocate for
them. As I stated in that book, there is no question that this cohort
of defendants “receive substandard counsel, are treated poorly in
prison, receive disparately longer sentences, and are regularly
coerced into confessing to crimes (many of which they did not
commit).” 10 What may be most scandalous of all is that we know

similar to Marvin Wilson and Robert Ladd) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Kira Lerner, Texas is About to Execute an Intellectually Disabled
Man, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/01/29/
3616830/robert-ladd-execution/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting on the case
of Robert Ladd, a murderer with the IQ of sixty-seven to whom Texas just denied
a stay of execution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Death for the Mentally Disabled, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21598681-can-you-execute-manwhose-iq-71-death-mentally-disabled (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing how
the defendant, going off to his execution, left behind his last-meal dessert, a piece
of pecan pie, to have “later”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with
Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003) [hereinafter What Atkins Could Mean]
(writing about potential changes to death penalty law now that Atkins outlawed
the execution of mentally retarded individuals).
8. Clive A. Stafford Smith & Rémy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending
that Death Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital PostConviction Proceedings, 45 LOY. L. REV. 55, 91 (1999).
9. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE
SHAME OF THE STATES (2013) [hereinafter MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH
PENALTY].
10. Id. at 45.
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that this is “a scandal of little interest to most lawyers, most
citizens, and most judges.” 11
As time passes within this “scandal” framework, several
snapshots emerge. 12 Perhaps the most important one is the corrupt
stench of prosecutorial misconduct that aids and abets this
scandalous shame with absolutely no consequences to the lawyers
involved (other than, in some cases, promotions and re-elections by
wider margins than previously). 13 There can no longer be any
question—if there ever was—that this misconduct is “a leading
cause of wrongful convictions.” 14 This prosecutorial misconduct, of
course, does not stand alone, for it could not. It is aided and abetted
by the courts, sometimes via explicit judicial bias (examples of
racial bias by judges such as the infamous Edith Jones are well

11. Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to
Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315, 315 (2003) [hereinafter Life Is in Mirrors].
12. For a sampling of recent press stories about this issue, see Susan Greene,
Court Finds Government Misconduct Tainted Colorado Death Penalty Case, COLO.
INDEP.
(Nov.
22,
2013),
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/
145028/government-misconduct-found-in-david-bueno-death-penalty-case (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dahlia
Lithwick, You’re All Out, SLATE (May 28, 2015), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/orange_county_prosecutor_mis
conduct_judge_goethals_takes_district_attorney.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sarah Rumpf, Texas Bar
Alleges Prosecutorial Misconduct in Case of Man Executed in 2004, BREITBART
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/03/20/texas-bar-allegesprosecutorial-misconduct-in-case-of-man-executed-in-2004/ (last visited Sept. 8,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. Prosecutorial misconduct amounts to a constitutional violation if it “so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that “the Darden standard is a very general one.” Parker
v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012). However, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012),
“recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable
manner.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). See also infra notes
141–146 and accompanying text (discussing Panetti). I have discussed aspects of
this before in Michael L. Perlin, “Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed”:
Mental Disability, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Death Penalty, 43 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 266 (2015) [hereinafter Power and Greed and the
Corruptible Seed].
14. Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, The Self-Training Prosecutor, and
Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715,
727–28 (2011) [hereinafter The Lone Miscreant].
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known 15) but more often by what I call passive judicial complicity. 16
By way of example, an Arizona reporter found that “even when
they do make findings of prosecutorial misconduct, judges often do
not report the offenders to the Bar for investigation and potential
disciplinary hearings.” 17 In his song Hurricane, Bob Dylan
15. See, e.g., Anna Arceneaux, Montez Spradley, an Innocent Man Once on
ACLU
(Sept.
10,
2015,
12:00
PM),
Death
Row,
Is
Free,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/montez-spradley-innocent-man-once-deathrow-free (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (explaining how the jury voted to sentence
Montez Spradley to life in prison, but the judge used a judicial override to
sentence him to death) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brandi
Grissom, Complaint: Judge’s Death Penalty Remarks Show Racial Bias, TEX.
TRIB. (June 4, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/06/04/complaint-judgescomments-show-bias-death-penalty/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting how
Judge Jones told law students that “racial groups like African-Americans and
Hispanics are predisposed to crime”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). For an astonishing story of how a judge in a death penalty case
exchanged hundreds of texts with the district attorney who was prosecuting the
defendant, see Gardiner & Scheinberg, NAT’L COUNCIL OF CERTIFIED DEMENTIA
PRACS., https://cases.nationalcdp.org/gardiner-scheinberg/ (last visited Sept. 8,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. To the best of my knowledge, this phrase—“passive judicial complicity”—
does not appear in the legal literature in this context. There is significant
commentary on judicial complicity in the sanctioning of Jim Crow segregation.
See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren,
Brown, and a Theory Of Racial Redemption, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73, 135–
36 (1998) (explaining the various legal doctrines cited by the Supreme Court in
refusing to protect civil rights during the years of the Warren Court). See
generally Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1005–08 (1968)
(reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS
TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856)). On domestic
violence, see Zanita E. Fenton, Mirrored Silence: Reflections on Judicial
Complicity in Private Violence, 78 OR. L. REV. 995 (1999). On judicial complicity
in improper convictions generally, see Hans Sherrer, The Complicity of Judges in
the Generation of Wrongful Convictions, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 539 (2003). The phrase
“passive complicity” is used mostly in the context of affirmative action law, see,
e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, Life after Adarand: What Happened to the Metro
Broadcasting Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Telecommunications
Ownership?, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 87, 107 (1999–2000) (noting that the
discrimination plaintiffs need to show in such cases “could either be by the
governmental actor or by its ‘passive complicity’ in the discrimination of others”),
but the first use appears to be as it relates to the failure of the free world to
respond to the mass murder of Jews during World War II. Victoria Barnett. See
generally Provocative Reconciliation, 117 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 942 (2001).
17. Michael Kiefer, When Prosecutors Get Too Close to the Line, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.nimodopress.com/blog/2014/4/21/4dwgoz
41k0vp18u7808bb61jz6yv61 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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castigated the Passaic County press for its complicity in the case
of the falsely-convicted Ruben “Hurricane” Carter, singing “Bello
and Bradley and they both baldly lied/And the newspapers, they
all went along for the ride.” 18 Here I argue that it is the judiciary
that regularly “goes along for the ride.”
In this Article I seek to answer why persons with mental
disabilities are so often improperly brought to trial and convicted
in death penalty cases. In answering this question, I focus on
ongoing prosecutorial misconduct, sometimes aided and abetted by
judicial bias and judicial complicity. 19 Here, I assess why we blind
18. Bob
Dylan
&
Jacques
Levy,
Hurricane,
BOB
DYLAN,
http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/hurricane (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). I discuss the implications of this song
for the teaching of criminal law and procedure in Michael L. Perlin, Tangled up
in Law: The Jurisprudence of Bob Dylan, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1404–07
(2011).
Carter was convicted and his conviction was affirmed. See State v. Carter, 255
A.2d 746, 753–55 (N.J. 1969) (affirming Carter’s conviction despite numerous
evidentiary issues and prosecutorial missteps). He moved for a new trial based
upon the State’s failure to disclose evidence and the testimonial recantation by
the star witnesses against him, but his motions were denied. State v. Carter, 347
A.2d 383, 388 (Passaic County Ct. 1975) (ruling that constitutional due process
concerns are satisfied if the defendant had “the benefit and guidance of a
competent attorney,” even if there were errors during the trial, because even “the
best of counsel makes mistakes”); State v. Carter, 345 A.2d 808, 829 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1974) (stating that the withheld evidence tape did not necessarily
constitute exculpatory evidence, so a new trial was not mandated). The New
Jersey Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s decision based on the failure to
disclose key evidence. See State v. Carter, 354 A.2d 627, 635 (N.J. 1976) (ordering
a new trial on the basis that the withheld October 11 tape had the capacity to
affect the jury’s decision and substantially prejudice Carter’s trial). Carter was
again convicted, and that conviction was upheld by the state Supreme Court by a
4–3 vote. State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280, 1284 (N.J. 1982) (affirming the
conviction despite a strongly worded dissent that referred to the case as
presenting unparalleled Brady violations). Ultimately, his application for a writ
of habeas corpus was granted—the court found that his conviction was
“predicated upon an appeal to racism rather than reason, and concealment rather
than disclosure.” Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D.N.J. 1985).
19. There are other factors as well:
• Explicit juror bias, what I call sanism, in individual cases. See, e.g.,
Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases:
The Puzzling Role of Mitigating Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE
DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239, 257 (1994) [hereinafter Sanist
Lives] (describing sanism as “an irrational prejudice of the same quality
and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are
reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia
and ethnic bigotry”); see also infra note 137 (defining sanism further).
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ourselves to these realities, and how they make it utterly
impossible for the death penalty to ever be administered in a “fair”
way, especially in cases involving defendants with mental
disabilities. I will also examine these issues through the lens of
therapeutic jurisprudence and will conclude that our current
system utterly rejects the bedrock principles of that school of
jurisprudence—voice, validation, and voluntariness—in ways that
contribute to true mockeries of justice. It is noteworthy that this
analysis could not be done without recognition of the pervasive
problem of ineffective assistance of counsel in the cases of which I
speak.

• The consistently pretextual positions of four current Supreme Court
judges in all matters dealing with the overlap between mental
disability and criminal behavior, culminating in Justice Alito’s bizarre
dissent in Hall. On pretextuality in the way that judges deal with cases
involving defendants with mental disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin,
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 625, 639 (1993); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR
DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY (2013).
See infra note 137 (defining pretextuality); infra text accompanying
note 179 (discussing “therapeutic jurisprudence” in the context of
pretextuality).
• The lack of availability of trained counsel—from the very first stages of
the lawyer-client relationship—that can accurately identify mental
disability, and then (a) strategically plan mental disability-based
defenses and/or mitigation strategies, and (b) engage appropriate
experts to assist in trial preparation and trial. See MENTAL DISABILITY
AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 57–58 (expounding on the
problem magnified by Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1976), in
which the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to
collateral review or to the assistance of counsel in collateral
proceedings).
• The lower courts’ penurious interpretations of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68 (1985) (right of indigent defendant to independent psychiatrist to aid
in presentation of insanity defense), in cases involving defendants with
intellectual disabilities or severe neurological disorders, making the
proceedings in these cases—in which it is virtually impossible for these
defendants (post-Giarratano) to even comprehend the substantive law
or the process in the expedited time procedures that are increasingly
imposed—an utter sham. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Expediting Death:
Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in
Capital Cases, 59 UMKC L. REV. 55 n.99 (1990) (stating that an
“indigent defendant is entitled to state-provided access to a psychiatrist
at both guilt and sentencing phases of capital trial”). I will address
these issues in a subsequent article.
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My title comes, in part, from the second verse of Bob Dylan’s
brilliant song, Changing of the Guards: “Fortune calls/I stepped
forth from the shadows, to the marketplace/Merchants and
thieves, hungry for power, my last deal gone down.” 20 The song,
per the great Dylanologist Oliver Trager, is about “control of a
world ruled by power and death,” 21 and I think that is just about
right. There is no question that the criminal trial process is a
“marketplace” (consider the new academic attention paid to the
question of the “due process of plea bargaining”), and that death
penalty trials result when one’s “last deal” was not able to have
“gone down.” But, to the point, I believe that the prosecutoriate—
“hungry for power”—serve all too often as both “merchants and
thieves” in this process. I hope that this Article sheds some light
on this loathsome state of affairs.
II. Mental Disability, the Death Penalty and Prosecutorial
Misconduct22
There is no question that the death penalty is
disproportionately imposed in cases involving defendants with
mental disabilities (referring both to those with mental illness and
with intellectual disabilities, more commonly referred to as mental
retardation). 23 In the words of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr.: “The greatest threat to justice
and the Rule of Law in death penalty cases is state prosecutorial
malfeasance—an old, widespread, and persistent habit.” 24
Persons with mental disabilities are significantly overrepresented at every level of the criminal justice system. 25
20. Bob Dylan, Changing of the Guards, BOB DYLAN, http://www.bobdylan.
com/us/songs/changing-guards (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 104 (2004).
22. Portions of the following section are adapted from Power and Greed and
the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13.
23. Id. at 266–67.
24. Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr., Symposium, Prosecutorial Error in Death
Penalty Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2009).
25. Edward A. Polloway et al., Special Challenges for Persons with
Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: Introduction to the Special Issue, 19
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Estimates of those with intellectual disability range from 10–30%,
and of those with mental illness from 10–70%. 26 These wide ranges
reveal another truth, which is that our databases about these
populations are deeply flawed. 27
Mental disability confounds all stages of the criminal justice
system: from pre-contact to initial contact to intake and
interrogation, to prosecution and disposition, and to
incarceration. 28 In the context of capital punishment, these
coalesce most vividly in the context of the false confessions. 29 While
there are many reasons why persons with mental disabilities are
sentenced to death for murders that they did not commit, and other
reasons why they are sentenced to death in cases where
individuals without mental disabilities might have been spared the
death penalty, 30 the most prevalent issue is that of false
confessions. Of the first 130 exonerations that the New York-based
Innocence Project obtained via DNA evidence, 85 involved people
convicted after false confessions. 31
EXCEPTIONALITY 211, 212 (2011).
26. See Julie D. Cantor, Of Pills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the
Psychotic Inmate When Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 119, 136 (2005)
(providing anecdotes about how inmates on death row can descend into psychosis
as they linger away in prison).
27. For one rigorous study, see Henry Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious
Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 761, 764 (2009)
(reporting that a jail study revealed that the rate of current serious mental illness
for male inmates was 14.5% and for female inmates it was 31%). More recent
estimates calculate 40% of Rikers Island inmates have some sort of mental illness.
See Bandy X. Lee & Maya Prabhu, A Reflection on the Madness in Prisons, 26
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 254 (2015) (noting how the rising levels of inmates
with mental illness at Rikers Island are providing increasingly difficult
challenges for prison officials).
28. Polloway et al., supra note 25, at 214–17.
29. See, e.g., Richard Leo & Richard Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (reporting
the stories of Jack Carmen, David Vasquez, Johnny Lee Wilson, and other
individuals who were sentenced to death after a false confession).
30. For an overview of these cases, see the Death Penalty Information
Center’s articles on mental illness and the death penalty. Mental Illness, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/mental-illness-and-deathpenalty (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
31. Tracey Maclin, A Criminal Procedure Regime Based on Instrumental
Values, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 230 n.68 (2005).
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Mental disability is a commonly recognized risk factor for false
confessions. Valid and reliable evidence has taught us that false
confessors have been found to score higher on measures of anxiety,
depression, anger, extraversion, and psychoticism as well as being
more likely to have seen a mental health professional or taken
psychiatric medications in the year prior. 32 One of the leading
articles on this phenomenon notes that “an inability to distinguish
fact from fantasy due to a breakdown in reality monitoring, a
common feature of major mental illness,” is a major contributing
factor to such false confessions. 33 And there is no disputing Allison
Redlich’s conclusion that “legal safeguards for persons with mental
disorders afford little protection during the investigation phase” of
a criminal case, 34 the period of time during which such false
confessions are most likely to occur. 35
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Atkins, defendants with
intellectual disabilities “have diminished capacities to understand
and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning,
to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” 36
32. Gisli Gudjonsson et al., Custodial Interrogation, False Confession, and
Individual Differences: A National Study Among Icelandic Youth, 41 PERSONALITY
& INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 49 (2006); Gisli Gudjonsson et al., Confessions and
Denials and the Relationship with Personality, 9 LEG. & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 121 (2004); Gisli Gudjonsson et al., Interrogation and False Confession
Among Adolescents in Seven European Countries: What Background and
Psychological Variables Best Discriminate Between False Confessors and NonFalse Confessors?, 15 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 711 (2009).
33. Saul Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 14 (2010). From 1990 to 2013, 2000
defendants were found to have been falsely convicted; 300 of the exonerations
were the results of DNA testing. These facts “defy common belief” that wrongful
convictions are “extremely rare” occurrences. Rachel Pecker, Note, Quasi-Judicial
Prosecutors and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence: Granting Recusals to Make
Impartiality a Reality, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2013).
34. Allison D. Redlich, Law & Psychiatry: Mental Illness, Police
Interrogations, and the Potential for False Confession, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 19
(2004).
35. See generally JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000). See
also Jennifer J. Ratliff et al., The Hidden Consequences of Racial Salience in
Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200,
200–01 (2010) (reporting how 15% of false confessions took place during the initial
interrogation phase).
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002).
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When discussing false convictions in death penalty cases of
individuals with mental disabilities, Professor John Blume and his
colleagues considered the following, in addition to the false
confessions issue: (1) the difficulties such individuals have
assisting counsel; (2) their often inappropriate demeanor; and
(3) their vulnerability to exploitation by codefendants and/or
snitches. 37
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
There is typically great political incentive for prosecutors to
seek the death penalty and for trial judges to impose it. 38 Professor
James Liebman explains:
In all capital-sentencing jurisdictions, but particularly in
ones where the political rewards of capital punishment
are high and direct (for example, where elections for
district attorney and trial judge are frequent and partisan
and where voters favor the death penalty) and in ones that
believe themselves to be under siege from violent crime,
such offenses create incentives to move swiftly and surely
from arrest to conviction to capital verdict. 39
37. See John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Susan E. Millor, Convicting
Lennie: Mental Retardation, Wrongful Convictions, and the Right to a Fair Trial,
56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 943, 954–58 (2012) (explaining how defendants with
mental illness often act “tough” or “hardened” to conceal their confusion, which
complicates any effective defense from their counsel, makes them appear
heartless in front of the jury, and makes them vulnerable to the tricks of other
codefendants).
38. Of course, the starting point is the reality that it is the prosecutor who
decides whether or not to pursue the death penalty in a given case. See Pecker,
supra note 33, at 1619 (describing how the extent of prosecutorial discretion has
led the Supreme Court to refer to prosecutors as “judicial or quasi-judicial
officers”).
39. James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST.
L. J. 315, 322 (2002). In a footnote, Liebman quotes a newspaper article by Tina
Rosenberg about Philadelphia district attorney Lynne Abraham’s self-confessedly
“passionate” commitment to capital punishment, notwithstanding her doubts
whether it deters crime, and her use of it more often per homicide than any other
prosecutor in the nation, which follows from her conclusion that it gives citizens
“the feeling of control demanded by a city in decay,” especially in light of her
observation that “[w]e feel our lives are not in our own hands . . . This is Bosnia”.
Id. at 322 n.36 (quoting Tina Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
1995, at 22). For more information on the special issues raised in jurisdictions in
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In this context, is important to note how the imposition of the
death penalty is basically a county-by-county issue, resulting in
this anomaly: over a twenty-two year period, sixty-six American
counties accounted for 2,569 of the 5,131 death sentences
imposed. 40 Perhaps even more astonishingly, just 16% of the
nation’s counties (510 out of 3,143) accounted for 90% of its death
verdicts in the period. 41 Police, prosecutors, judges, and juries
operate with “strong incentives to generate as many death
sentences as they can—reaping robust psychic, political, and
professional rewards—while displacing the costs of their many
consequent mistakes onto capital prisoners, post-trial review
courts, victims, and the public.” 42
There is often “acute (and ever intensifying) political pressure”
on prosecutors “to seek the death penalty.” 43 Because defendants
with mental disabilities most engage a community’s fears, this
which prosecutors are elected, see Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking
Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates’
Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 941, 947 (1994). For
more information on the incentives in some jurisdictions supporting the pursuit
of death penalties by prosecutors, see Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An
Empirical Look at the Interplay between Institutional Incentives and Bounded
Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009).
40. James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden:
The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 264–65 n.40 (2011).
41. See id. at 265 (noting that, statistically, juries composed of 10% of
American residents were responsible for 38% of the capital sentences).
Philadelphia is discussed in this context in depth in Robert Smith, The Geography
of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 260–61 (2012)
(relaying the categorizing process that Philadelphia defense attorneys use to
properly defend capital cases). See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide
Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death
Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010).
42. James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2032 (2000); see also Liebman & Clarke, supra note 40, at 295 (“Local prosecutors
stand to gain by imposing as many death verdicts as possible, regardless of the
verdicts’ failure rate on appeal, because they quickly realize the political gains,
and the costs of review and reversal are slow to materialize and shouldered by
others.”). Professor J. Amy Dillard is clear: “Prosecutors abuse their discretion
when they choose to seek death in order to seat a death-disposed jury.” J. Amy
Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the Categorical
Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L. REV.
961, 1005 (2011).
43. Brian L. Vander Pol, Note: Relevance and Reconciliation: A Proposal
Regarding the Admissibility of Mercy Opinions in Capital Sentencing, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 707, 709 & n.2 (2003).
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pressure is certainly not diminished in cases of defendants with
mental disabilities. 44 And of course, because prosecutors “reap
political benefits from being tough on crime but do not typically
have to pay for expensive appeals, they have an incentive to seek
the death penalty in marginal cases that may be hard to defend on
appeal.” 45 They adopt a “conviction psychology,” one that presumes
guilt in all cases. 46 And these tactics, sadly, inevitably play well
with jurors. 47
Consider the 2014 exoneration of two African-American
mentally disabled death row inmates—one with an IQ in the 60s,
and the other with an IQ of 49—who were exonerated by DNA
evidence, some twenty years after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on their cases (over a stinging dissent by Justice
Blackmun), when it was determined that their confessions were
coerced and that they were factually innocent. 48 The District
Attorney who prosecuted the case—Joe Freeman Britt—was
profiled later on “Sixty Minutes” as the nation’s “deadliest D.A.
because he sought the death penalty so often.” 49 Notwithstanding
44. See Deborah C. Scott, et al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees:
Connecticut’s Psychiatric Security Review Board, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990) (noting that persons with mental disabilities are “the
most despised and feared group in society”).
45. Gershowitz, supra note 41, at 347–48.
46. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1010 n.208 (2009); see also George T.
Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110–19 (1975)
(defining “conviction psychology” as the mindset of a prosecutor who does not
believe that an innocent person would ever end up a criminal defendant).
47. See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 553 (4th ed. 2012) (discussing former Oklahoma City District
Attorney Robert Macy, who, according to journalistic accounts, “lied, . . . bullied,
[and] spurned the rules of a fair trial, concealing evidence, misrepresenting
evidence,” and yet consistently won re-election with more than 70% of the vote).
48. See McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1254 (1994) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (“That our system of capital punishment would single out Buddy
McCollum to die for this brutal crime only confirms my conclusion that the death
penalty experiment has failed.”); see also Jonathan Katz & Erick Eckholm, DNA
Evidence Clears Two Men in 1983 Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), at A1
(noting that the DNA evidence proved their neighbor—whose involvement had
been overlooked by the police, despite his confession to a rape and murder at a
concurrent time—had been responsible for the heinous crime).
49. See Matt Schudel, Joe Freeman Britt, Prosecutor Who Sent Dozens to
Death Row, Dies at 80, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/national/joe-freeman-britt-prosecutor-who-sent-dozens-to-death-row-
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the DNA evidence, he told the press recently that he “still believed
the men were guilty,” 50 indicating that he “could not understand
why much faith is put in DNA evidence.” 51 Revealingly, in
discussing the issue of the false confession, Britt said: “When we
tried these cases, every time they would bring in shrinks to talk
about how retarded they were[ ]. . . . It went on and on, blah-blahblah.” 52 The current DA—a distant cousin—subsequently called
Britt a bully, to which Britt replied, “If I was a bully, he is a pussy.
How about that?” 53
There are two back-stories here—to the best of my knowledge,
generally unreported in the popular press—that need be shared as
well. First, during the North Carolina state legislative election
campaign in November 2010,
the state Republican Party mailed a flyer that depicted mug
shots of two death row inmates, Wayne Laws and Henry
McCollum, to households in districts with contested races. The
flyer described their brutal crimes and cautioned the targeted
voters that because of their ‘ultra-liberal’ representative, Laws

dies-at-80/2016/04/15/b246f27e-025b-11e6-b823-707c79ce3504_story.html (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (attributing the quote “[g]o after them and tear that jugular
out” to Britt, as stated in the “60 Minutes” interview) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
50. Id.
51. Richard Oppel, As Two Men Go Free, a Dogged Ex-Prosecutor Digs In,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), at A1, A13. On prosecutorial misconduct in other cases
involving potentially-exculpatory DNA evidence, see Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful
Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 163, 178 (2007) (discussing Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1063 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
52. Id.
53. Id. Other examples abound. Rachel Pecker notes:
In a recent Illinois exoneration, the district attorney resisted a finding
of innocence after DNA excluded five male defendants who had falsely
confessed to the crime when they were teenagers. She explained, “[a]s
a prosecutor, I have a duty to the victims in this case.” Another
prosecutor explained, “[t]he taxpayers don’t pay us for intellectual
curiosity. They pay us to get convictions.”
Pecker, supra note 33, at 1618 n.38 (quoting Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence
Suggests ‘Innocent,’ Some Prosecutors Cling to ‘Maybe,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2011), at A19 and Andrew Martin, The Prosecutor’s Case Against DNA, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011), § 6, at 44)..
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and McCollum “might be moving out of jail and into [y]our
neighborhood sometime soon.” 54

Second, in the case of Callins v. Collins, 55 in dissenting from
the Court’s decision to not grant certiorari, Justice Blackmun
famously said that he would “no longer tinker with the machinery
of death,” and would never vote again to affirm a death penalty
conviction. 56 In response to Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia
sneered at the decision to announce this manifesto in the case
before the court, noting that it was “less brutal” than many others,
counterpointing with the facts of the McCollum case:
The death-by-injection which Justice BLACKMUN describes
looks pretty desirable next to that. It looks even better next to
some of the other cases currently before us which Justice
BLACKMUN did not select as the vehicle for his announcement
that the death penalty is always unconstitutional—for example,
the case of the eleven year-old girl raped by four men and then

54. Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Confronting Race: How a
Confluence of Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to Go Where the
McCleskey Court Wouldn’t, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 500–01 (2011) (quoting
Rob Christensen, Potshots Turn Nasty in N.C. Legislative Races: Democrats and
Republicans Resort to Outdated Charges, Fear-Mongering, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/10/21/1776187/potshotsturn-nasty-in-nc-legislative.html#ixzz1I7LpvV1v (last visited July 19, 2016) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). Of course, how a state legislator
could free a convicted prisoner was never explained, but the campaign was
successful.
55. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
56. Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further stated:
For more than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—
along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of
fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle
the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved
and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty
experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no
combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.
The basic question—does the system accurately and consistently
determine which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—cannot be answered in
the affirmative.
Id.
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killed by stuffing her panties down her throat. See McCollum v.
North Carolina, cert. pending, No. 93–7200. 57

It clearly never occurred to Scalia that McCollum might have
been innocent of the crime with which he was charged. In
commenting on these events, Dahlia Lithwick has perceptively
observed:
It was once the case that McCollum was held out, to the
collective members of the Supreme Court, as the very worst of
the worst, deserving of death because of the heinousness of his
crimes. Having shown that he never committed that crime, it
seems high time to ask whether, in the view of some Supreme
Court Justices, that would have even made a difference had we
executed him. 58

We should think about McCollum in the context of Justice
Scalia’s jaw-dropping assertion that “this Court has never held that
the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant
who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a
habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.” 59
I turn my attention now to the trial bench. How do trial judges
respond in those jurisdictions in which they have the opportunity
to alter sentences? 60 According to a report done by the Equal
57. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1142–43 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. See Dahlia Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in North
Carolina, SLATE (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2014/09/henry_lee_mccollum_cleared_by_dna_evidence_in_north_
carolina_after_spending.2.html (Sept. 3, 2014, 5:37 PM) (last visited June 21,
2016) [hereinafter A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice] (noting that the denial of
certiorari occurred decades before DNA evidence proved McCollum’s innocence)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Again, as Lithwick points out,
there is nothing in Justice Blackmun’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in
McCollum’s case. See McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1255 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that McCollum was factually innocent; his
opinion is premised on McCollum’s unquestioned developmental disability).
59. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. In three states (Florida, Alabama, and Delaware), judges have the ability
to overturn jury sentences in death penalty cases. See Michael L. Radelet,
Overriding Jury Sentencing Recommendations in Florida Capital Cases: An
Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793, 794 (2011)
(reporting that, while Florida judges have the ability to reverse the jury’s
determination in either direction, they usually choose to override verdicts that
hand down life sentences instead of death penalties). As this Article went to press,
the Delaware Supreme Court found that the state capital sentencing statute
unconstitutionally allowed a judge (and not a jury) to find an aggravating
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Justice Institute, in Florida (a state where judges are elected),
there has not been a single judicial override of a jury-imposed
death penalty in twelve years; in Alabama (another judicial
election state), 92% of judicial overrides are to impose death
sentences in cases in which jurors recommended life
imprisonment; on the other hand, in Delaware (where judges are
appointed), no judge has ever imposed a death sentence via judicial
override. 61 Importantly, judges override juries to impose the death
penalty more often in a judicial election year. 62
IV. Outcomes of Misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct is rampant. 63 In one Arizona study,
prosecutorial misconduct was alleged in half of all capital cases,
and was found by appellate courts to be reversal-worthy in fortycircumstance for the weighing phase. See Rauf v. State, No. 39, 2016 WL 4224252,
at *1 (Del. Aug. 2, 2016) (holding that the statute was unconstitutional because
these unconstitutional provisions could not be severed).
61. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Using the Death Penalty to Get Re-Elected, ROOT
(July 20, 2011), http://www.theroot.com/articles/politics/2011/07/judges_death_
penalty_used_for_reelection/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting that Alabama
judges usually exercised their override power when the victim was white) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a further discussion of judicial
override and the death penalty, see DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 48 (2010).
62. See Ifill, supra note 61 (noting that thirty-eight states still elect their
judges); see also Fred B. Burnside, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury
Override, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1017 (1999) (giving examples of judges citing their
decisions to override jury life sentences in their campaigns or being voted out of
office for their failure to impose or uphold death verdicts). See generally Stephen
B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759
(1995); Daniel Richman, Framing the Prosecution, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 697 n.88
(2014) (discussing Claire S.H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and
Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV.
1360, 1361–62 (2013) (comparing the sentencing variation among elected and
appointed judges in Kansas)). On this variation in the area of sentencing of sex
offenders (coming to a similar conclusion), see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L.
Perlin, “They’re Planting Stories in the Press”: The Impact of Media Distortions on
Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185 (2013).
63. On how available statistics “significantly underreport the extent of
prosecutorial misconduct,” see David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 212 (2011).
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percent of that cohort. 64 The important question, though, is what
happens when there is prosecutorial misconduct? In a study of the
thirteen executions that have occurred in California since the
death penalty was reinstated there in 1977, “prosecutorial
misconduct has been raised as a significant issue in seven—more
than half.” 65 This cohort of cases includes at least one case in which
the prosecutor lied—there is no other word for it—to the jury about
the consequences if a “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict were
to be entered, 66 lies that the California Supreme Court later
deemed to be “harmless error.” 67 Certainly, this sort of judicial
behavior bespeaks the sort of complicity discussed earlier.
As I have previously written:
Other cases from other jurisdictions show this same judicial
sanctioning of lies on the consequences of a successful insanity
plea. In only one jurisdiction [Florida] have convictions been
reversed in such circumstances, the reviewing court in one case
noting that ‘the prosecution cannot suggest to the jury that an

64. Michael Kiefer, Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged in Half of Capital
Cases, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 28, 2013 11:09 AM), http://www.azcentral.
com/news/arizona/articles/20131027milke-krone-prosecutors-conduct-day1.html
(last updated Nov. 25, 2013) (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling that the prosecution has the burden of reporting any exonerating evidence
that they find) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. Natasha Minsker, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 45
CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 375 (2009) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death
Penalty Cases]; see also Natasha Minsker & Daniel Ballon, Forum Column, SAN
FRANCISCO DAILY J. (Oct. 18, 2007).
66. Minsker, supra note 65, at 382–87 (discussing People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal.
3d 660 (1988)). As reported in MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra
note 9, at 246 n.129, the prosecutor’s comments included the following:
“We are letting justice be decided on the basis of how well a psychiatrist
can sell their bag of tricks,” and, “they [psychiatrists] are so vain as to
think they are capable of all these magical, mystical things they say
they are capable of.”
“[W]e have a social cancer in our community now, and it is this very
process of allowing psychiatrists to come in and make their moral
pronouncements disguised as medical opinion in the hopes of
persuading jurors to let people off the hook.”
“I’m going to find this guy crazy and let him go home.”
“[E]very time somebody gets mad, they are free to commit any crime
they want, and they can be found not guilty by reason of insanity.”
67. MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 705.
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acquittal would result in the defendant’s release from an
asylum in just a few months.’ 68
Often, even where prosecutorial misconduct in such is found,
the errors are deemed harmless, not of constitutional
magnitude, or improperly preserved. Nearly seventy years ago,
Judge Jerome Frank charged that ‘Government attorneys,
without fear of reversal, may say just about what they please in
addressing juries, for our rules on the subject are pretend-rules.’
Little has changed since. 69

Convictions in cases replete with serious prosecutorial
misconduct are regularly affirmed, whether they are based on
inflammatory statements to jurors in closing arguments, 70 on
68. Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13, at 268
(quoting Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346, 1354 (Fla. 1990)). See, e.g., Lautner
v. Berghuis, 694 F. Supp. 2d 698, 729 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (stating that
inappropriate questions directed to an expert witness can be harmless, since
juries are “free to disregard the expert testimony and draw [their] own
conclusions from the evidence and lay testimony” (citation omitted)); McGregor v.
Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (basing the decision on the fact that federal
habeas relief is not mandated by state law errors), overruled en banc on other
grounds, 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001). In Lautner, the prosecutor also warned
that the defendant would go free if found not guilty for reason of insanity, stating,
“Now folks are we going to turn [defendant] loose on society by reason of
insanity[?]” Lautner, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 730. In McGregor, the prosecutor
indicated to prospective jurors that Mr. McGregor would walk out of the
courtroom a free man if the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.
McGregor, 219 F.3d at 1256.
69. Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13, at 268; see also
State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892, 915 (Utah 2012) (using the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard to determine whether an error was harmless enough for the
reviewing court to leave the conviction in place); Morris v. Hedgpeth, No. EDCV
09–00664 VAP (SS), 2011 WL 3861650, at *24–25 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2011)
(explaining that prosecutorial misconduct can violate the Constitution and still
not violate due process if the error was harmless); People v. Cruz, 605 P.2d 830
(Cal. 1980) (stating that, to preserve allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on
appeal, the defense counsel must have objected during the trial and requested
jury admonitions).
70. For examples of these cases, see generally U.S. ex rel. Tenner v. Gilmore,
No. 97 C 2305, 1998 WL 721115 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 1998); Dunigan v. Yarborough,
No. ED CV 04-00498-CAS (VBK), 2009 WL 6824504 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009);
Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050 (Pa. 2012); People v. Babbitt, 755 P.2d
253 (Cal. 1988). In Frederick v. State, the court found no error where the
prosecutor had argued that defendants who claimed mental illness “had a motive
to absolve themselves of criminal liability.” 37 P.3d 908, 946 (Okla. Crim. App.
2001). See also Terry Ganey, Questions Raised about Hulshof’s Performance in
1996 Murder Case, COLUMBIA (MO.) DAILY TRIBUNE (June 7, 2009, 5:50 AM)
(updated
Jan.
23,
2013
1:13
PM),
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failure
to
turn
over
documentary
evidence, 71
on
72
mischaracterization of expert testimony on mental state, or on
mischaracterization of the prevailing legal standard for an
insanity defense. 73 These affirmances are common in cases where
the insanity defense is proffered, 74 where the incompetency status
is raised, 75 where extreme emotional disturbance is alleged, 76 and
where mitigation is sought at the penalty phase 77—in short, in
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/perspectives/questions-raised-abouthulshof-s-performance-in-murder-case/article_fef7d9d4-8fb6-5678-b4fd-5849
b01a3bcc.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (quoting judge on post-conviction relief
application in a case of a factually innocent defendant who had been convicted of
murder as saying, “We now know that none of what Mr. Hulshof [the district
attorney] said in the final summary was true”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
71. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that
the state’s failure to preserve evidence did not necessarily prejudice the trial);
Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to grant a new trial
on the basis that minimal effort by the defense counsel should have discovered
the evidence that the prosecution withheld), reh’g & suggestion for reh’g en banc
denied (6th Cir. 2001). Coleman was reversed based on a violation of the Supreme
Court’s effectiveness-of-counsel standard established in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). On the application of Strickland in death
penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities, see MENTAL
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 123–38. On the question of
violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in general, see infra notes
127–128. An expose of the New Orleans District Attorney’s office characterizes it
as beset by “a culture of indifference about disclosing exculpatory evidence.”
Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the
System that Protects Them, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Aug. 1, 2013, 2:18 PM) (updated
Aug.
5,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorialmisconduct-new-orleans-louisiana_n_3529891.html (last visited June 23, 2016)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. See People v. Smith, 107 P.3d 229, 240 (Cal. 2005) (distinguishing
between instances in which improper expert testimony is prejudicial or not);
People v. Blacksher, 259 P.3d 370, 399 (Cal. 2011) (ruling that, although the
expert testimony was improperly admitted, the defendant was still required to
establish prejudice).
73. See Fleenor v. Farley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1055 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding
that the misstatement given to the jury was not serious enough to invalidate due
process).
74. See generally Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989).
75. See generally State v. Neyland, 12 N.E.3d 1112 (Ohio 2014).
76. See generally Bowling v. Commonwealth, 873 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1993).
77. See generally People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1999); Berry v.
Epps, No. 1:04CV328-D-D, 2006 WL 2865064 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 5, 2006); Lang v.
Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Lang was also reversed on a
Strickland violation. Id. at 1087 (“As respects the bifurcated claim of ineffective
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cases where a defendant’s mental disability is raised. Although
there are some instances of reversals, 78 in this cohort they are a
distinct minority. 79 Courts simply say that the role of the reviewing
court is “to act only as a kind of constitutional backstop to ensure
that trial errors do not so infect the trial as to render it
fundamentally unfair.” 80 This behavior on the part of courts is
judicial complicity at its worst.
The scandalous level of inadequacy of counsel 81 made
available to this cohort of defendants is well known. As Stephen
Bright has concluded, “[t]he death penalty will too often be
punishment not for committing the worst crime, but for being
assigned the worst lawyer.” 82 Similarly, the Harvard Law Review
has unequivocally charged: “The utter inadequacy of trial and
appellate lawyers for capital defendants has been widely
recognized as the single most spectacular failure in the
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, the court finds that trial counsel
provided deficient performance at the penalty phase.”).
78. For reversals based on the issue of adequacy of counsel, see Lang, 725 F.
Supp. 2d at 942, Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001), and Littlejohn
v. Trammel, 704 F.3d 817, 822 (10th Cir. 2013). For an intermediate appellate
reversal on the misconduct issue, see Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 314 (6th Cir.
2000), superseded by statute on other grounds in Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct.
2148 (2012) (explaining that the prosecutor’s comments were “peppered with the
type of ‘know-nothing appeals to ignorance’ that deprive defendants of their right
to a fair consideration of their insanity defense”).
79. For other cases finding no error, see Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 933 (2001) abrogated by Neill v. Gibson,
278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001), Sneed v. Johnson, No. 1:04CV 588, 2007 WL
709778 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2007), and Hamilton v. Ayers, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1075
(E.D. Cal. 2006).
80. Fleenor v. Farley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1053 (S.D. Ind. 1998). See also
Leslie A. Harris, Putting a Hold on the Death Penalty, 24 HUM. RTS. (Winter 1997)
(“Congress has systematically dismantled the federal safeguards that serve as a
constitutional backstop to state proceedings.”).
81. See Michael L. Perlin, The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden:
The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 201, 204 (1996) [hereinafter The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden]
(stating that Strickland v. Washington established a “pallid, nearly-impossibleto-violate, adequacy standard,” requiring simply that counsel’s efforts be
“reasonable” under the circumstances (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 668 (1984))).
82. Stephen Bright, Death by Lottery—Procedural Bar of Constitutional
Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent
Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 695 (1990).
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administration of capital punishment.” 83 I have written about
inadequacy in this context before and have concluded that it is
truly a “farce and mockery” to perpetuate a system in which
grossly unqualified lawyers are appointed to represent defendants
facing the death penalty, especially in cases where defendants
have mental disabilities. 84 It is essential that this paper be
contextualized in that reality. It is important to add an additional
confounding factor here, in the context of the “harmless error”
cases. 85 This doctrine is at play in appellate matters in which there
was no objection raised or error preserved at trial. 86 Such
substandard counsel, simply put, fails to object to objectionable
evidence and prosecutorial behavior, making the likelihood of
reversal—always a slim possibility—even slimmer. Per Professor
Sharon Dolovich, the case law reflects not just “serious
incompetence but even incapacitation on the part of counsel.” 87
Since 1908, the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics has
recognized that the prosecutor’s duty to see that justice is done
includes an obligation not to suppress facts capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused. 88 In language that has been repeated
countless times, “The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done.” 89
Nonetheless, prosecutorial misconduct is the basis for over a fifth

83. Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1923 (1994).
84. MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 135.
85. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002) (stating that the
government has the opportunity to show that the deviation did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights to the extent that the deviation requires reversal);
see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (asking whether it is “clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant
guilty absent the error”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“[A]ny error, defect, irregularity,
or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
86. See generally (Judge) Harry Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995).
87. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 436 (2004) (emphasis added).
88. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 5 (1908), reprinted in
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES WITH THE
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
ANNOTATED (American Bar Association 1957), at 2–3.
89. Id.
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of all death penalty reversals, 90 and there is little disputing
Professor Angela Davis’s conclusion that “prosecutorial
misconduct is widespread and unchecked.” 91
Scholars and critics have frequently focused on
“prosecutorial
misconduct . . .
[and]
the
injustice
of
subjecting . . . persons with serious mental disorders to capital
punishment” as essential elements of the “pervasive unfairness”
in the modern implementation of the death penalty. 92 But what
has mostly escaped attention is the way that prosecutorial
misconduct festers in especially deadly ways in the trial of cases
involving this cohort of defendants; in the words of Dr. Saby
Ghoshray, “the deadly cocktail of racial disparity, inadequate
counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct continues to interject
lethal consequences for mentally incapacitated prisoners.” 93
90. See Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death
Penalty: What Went Wrong?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 423 (2001) (explaining
that the other two major categories for reversals were judicial error and defense
counsel error, at 50% and 19%, respectively); see also Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor,
In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
695, 704 n.63 (2007) (noting that the most common prosecutorial actions of
misconduct involved suppressing mitigating or exonerating evidence).
91. ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 135 (2007). As Professor Davis has explained elsewhere,
Defining the universe of prosecutorial misconduct is a difficult
endeavor. Because it is so difficult to discover, much prosecutorial
misconduct goes unchallenged, suggesting that the problem is much
more widespread than the many reported cases of prosecutorial
misconduct would indicate. As one editorial described the problem, ‘It
would be like trying to count drivers who speed; the problem is larger
than the number of tickets would indicate.
Angela Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 278 (2007). For other discussions of prosecutorial
misconduct, see generally Bresler, supra note 39, at 954; Kim Wherry Toryanski,
No Ordinary Party: Prosecutorial Ethics and Errors in Death Penalty Cases, 54
FED. LAW. 45 (Jan. 2007).
92. Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death
Penalty, 1973–1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 2–3 (1994); see also Shannon
Heery, If It’s Constitutional, Then What’s the Problem?: The Use of Judicial
Override in Alabama Death Sentencing, 34 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 347, 381 (2010)
(discussing imposition of the death penalty in Alabama). Appeals often focus on
both issues. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the
Aftermath of the Ryan Commutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New
Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1352 n.207 (2010)
(discussing People v. Ramsey, 942 N.E. 2d 1168 (Ill. 2010)).
93. Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving Standards
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Professor Alafair Burke and others have raised the question of
whether many cases of prosecutorial misconduct may be more
attributable to cognitive bias 94 than intentional malfeasance, 95
but in this context, that attribution, while intellectually
interesting, in no way minimizes the harm done by some
prosecutors. 96
Why should prosecutors reform their ways? There is often
absolutely no accountability. 97 In some jurisdictions, convictions
of Decency: The Supreme Court’s Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 561, 617 (2006).
94. Cognitive biases are heuristic cognitive-simplifying devices that distort
our abilities to consider information rationally. See generally Michael L. Perlin,
“Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the
Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 343,
365 n.127 (2013), and sources cited. The heuristic at play here is the confirmation
bias through which we focus on information that confirms our preconceptions. See
generally Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender
Recidivism Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized
Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2012)
[hereinafter Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism] (quoting Eden B. King,
Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 54, 58 (2011)). Cognitive bias can also lead prosecutors
“to uphold their colleagues’ (other prosecutors’) decisions, as they would want
those prosecutors to do for them.” Pecker, supra note 33, at 1623 (citing Catherine
Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the
Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38
CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 294 (2001)).
95. See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J.
481, 492–98 (2009) (explaining reasons why prosecutors who are otherwise
conscientious and ethical might withhold evidence); see also Susan Bandes,
Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475,
479 (2006) [hereinafter Loyalty to One’s Convictions] (noting how prosecutors
have a “tendency to develop a fierce loyalty to a particular version of events”);
Alafair Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2006) (discussing tests that
have shown the effect that cognitive bias has on test subjects); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Keynote Address: Enhancing the Justice Mission in the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 343, 348 (2010) (extrapolating on the
necessity of zealous defense counsel to keep prosecutors from committing
intentional or unintentional violations).
96. On the “strong temptations” that prosecutors face to “shirk” their ethical
duties, see Bibas, supra note 46, at 1015, and see generally Loyalty to One’s
Convictions, supra note 95; Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138–48
(2004).
97. See, e.g., Keenan et al., supra note 63, at 212–13 (explaining how the
“harmless error” standard forces the defendant to not only prove prosecutorial
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are rarely reversed on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. 98 For
those in jurisdictions where it is an elective office, convictions
enhance re-electability. 99 Even if the misconduct is noticed, the
defendant’s conviction is still likely to stand. And there is no
stigma to the miscreant prosecutor since he is virtually never
mentioned by name in any subsequent appellate opinion. 100
Sanctions are nearly non-existent; by way of example, “a Chicago
Tribune article found that not one prosecutor was convicted of a
crime, disbarred, or publicly sanctioned in 381 murder cases where
the conviction was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct.” 101
Although scholars have written frequently and persuasively about
ethical breaches in such cases (and the need to monitor such
breaches), their words are generally met with overwhelming
indifference. 102
This leads to a further inquiry: To what extent are prosecutors
to blame for this state of affairs? I believe that at least four global
charges can be leveled against members of the prosecutoriate with
regard to the specific issue of the misuse and/or exploitation of
evidence of mental disability in death penalty cases: (1) the misuse
of evidence to play on the fears and emotions of jurors; (2) the use
of baseless expert witness testimony; (3) the suppression of

misconduct but also its prejudicial effect, if he wishes to get a verdict overturned).
98. See, e.g., Michelle Ghetti & Paul Killebrew, With Impunity: The Lack of
Accountability of a Criminal Prosecutor, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 349, 353–54 (2012)
(noting that, of 150 reported cases in Louisiana in which prosecutorial misconduct
was found, there were only twenty in which convictions were reversed).
99. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct
and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 399, 405 n.31 (2006) (reporting that “more than [ninety-five] percent of chief
prosecutors on the state and local level are elected”).
100. See Ghetti & Killebrew, supra note 98, at 357–58 (comparing criminal
cases, where the prosecutor’s name is omitted, to civil cases, where the lawyer’s
name is included and is available for public ridicule if he commits large errors).
101. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in
Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1370 n.251 (2009) (citing Adam Liptak,
Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 4).
102. For more on the lack of consequences for prosecutorial misconduct, see
generally Bresler, supra note 39; Myrna S. Raeder, Symposium: See No Evil:
Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by
Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413 (2007);
Toryanski, supra note 91.
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evidence; and (4) the improper use of antipsychotic medications at
trial. This Article discusses these charges in subsequent sections.
V. “Some Prosecutors Consciously Misuse Mental Disability
Evidence to Play on the Fears of, to Scare, and to Exploit the
Ignorance of Jurors.” 103
As I have discussed in the context of the subset of cases in
which an insanity defense is raised, prosecutors can lie with
impunity as to the likely denouement of an insanity acquittal.
Further, Stephen Bright has noted that, in the death penalty
context, “most prosecutors and other public officials exploit the
victims of crime and the death penalty for political gain by
stirring up and pandering to fears of crime.” 104 As I noted in an
earlier publication, “Professor Evan Mandery has pointed out
how prosecutors have systematically opposed legislation that
would exclude persons with serious mental illness from being
eligible for the death penalty.” 105
Jamie Fellner has carefully criticized the ways that
prosecutors often “vigorously challenge the existence of mental
retardation, minimize its significance, and suggest that
although a capital defendant may ‘technically’ be considered
retarded, he nonetheless has ‘street smarts’—and hence should
103. Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13, at 9.
104. Stephen Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly,
Counterproductive and Corrupting, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069, 1076 (1996).
105. MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 121 (citing
Evan J. Mandery, Executing the Insane, Retribution, and Temporal Justice, 43
CRIM. L. BULL. 981, 981–82 n.7 (2007) (quoting Andrea Weigl, Limit to Death
Penalty Sought; Bill Would Protect the Mentally Ill, NEWS & OBSERVER, May 13,
2007, at B1 (noting opposition by prosecutors to a North Carolina bill excluding
the mentally ill from the reach of the state death penalty statute), and Mike
Smith, Bill Would Ban Executions of Mentally Ill, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
23, 2001 (noting that the Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council opposes an
Indiana bill to exclude the mentally ill on grounds that jurors “should be able to
hear evidence and decide the issue of mental illness during the sentencing phases
of capital cases” and out of concern with the “ever expanding list of what
constitutes mental illness”))). See generally, What Atkins Could Mean, supra note
7; Emily Randolph, “Furiosis Solo Furore Punitur”: Should Mentally Ill Capital
Offenders Be Categorically Exempt from the Death Penalty?, 3 MENT. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y J. 578 (2014) (arguing that such offenders should be exempt from the
death penalty).
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receive the highest penalty.” 106 In 2014, Hall v.
Florida 107 held that Florida’s “bright line” test of a seventy IQ as
the “gold standard” for executability was unconstitutional as it
created an “unacceptable risk” that persons with intellectual
disabilities would be executed, and was contrary to all professional
judgment. 108 In support of the majority’s views, Justice Kennedy
noted that neither Florida nor its supporting amici could “point to
a single medical professional who supports this cutoff,” and that
Florida’s rule “goes against unanimous professional consensus.” 109
In dissent, Justice Alito dismissed this universal expert position as
not reflecting the position of the American people but, “at best,
represent[ing] the views of a small professional elite.” 110 As such,
there is certainly some support in the U.S. Supreme Court for this
position that Fellner ably and appropriately decries. 111
106. Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental
Retardation, 28 HUM. RTS. 9, 12 (2002).
107. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
108. Id. at 1990.
109. Id. at 2000.
110. Id. at 2005 (emphasis added). See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS
CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (3d ed. 2016), § 17-4.2.3, at
17-117, 17-118 (critiquing Justice Alito’s opinion in this context). In a recent
article, Nancy Haydt, a veteran death penalty defense lawyer, notes drily that
Justice Alito thus “suggests that the general public has experience and training
in mental disorders.” Nancy Haydt, The DSM-5 and Criminal Defense: When Does
a Diagnosis Make a Difference?, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 847, 849 n.17 (2015).
111. Justice Alito’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001; see also generally Christopher
Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v. Florida and the
Possibility of a “Scientific Stare Decisis”, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415 (2014)
(discussing Hall). The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in Moore v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016), on the question of “[w]hether it violates the Eighth
Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), to prohibit the use of current
medical standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated
medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be executed.”
Question 1, Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Texas, in the case Ex Parte Briseno,
135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), had created a standard based on the
characteristics of Lennie, a fictional character in John Steinbeck’s novel Of Mice
and Men. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Consider Legal Standard Drawn
TIMES
(Aug.
22,
2016),
From
‘Of
Mice
and
Men,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/politics/supreme-court-to-consider-legalstandard-drawn-from-of-mice-and-men.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)
(reporting on how Texas developed a standard that does not reflect current
medical advances in determining mental disabilities) (on file with the Washington
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VI. Some Prosecutors Consciously Seek out Expert Witnesses Who
Will Testify—with Total Certainty—to a Defendant’s Alleged
Future Dangerousness, Knowing that Such Testimony Is Baseless.
The worthless and baseless testimony of Dr. James Grigson on
questions of future dangerousness, and how that testimony led
inexorably to the improper executions of defendants with mental
disabilities, is well known. 112 Dr. Grigson was decertified by the
American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society of
Psychiatric Physicians in 1995, 113 but he continued to testify in
death penalty proceedings for years after that. 114 A simple
Westlaw search reveals fifty-seven such cases from 1995 until his
death in 2004. 115 To the best of my knowledge, there have been no
sanctions brought against any of the prosecutors who retained him
to testify in this cohort of cases.
In this context, it is also essential to consider what Robert
Sanger recently unearthed about expert testimony in cases
assessing whether a defendant met the standards set down in
Atkins v. Virginia. 116 In his comprehensive article, Sanger
examines the ways that:
and Lee Law Review).
112. See MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 19–28
(discussing Dr. Grigson). On the science attendant to risk assessments of future
dangerousness, see Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of
Criminal History on Risk Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75 (2015). On risk
assessment evaluations in general, see John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk
Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA.
L. REV. 391 (2006).
113. See Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 556 n.6 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining
the circumstances behind Dr. Grigson’s loss of his license).
114. See Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence of
the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 189, 257 n.331 (2004) (discussing Sterling v. Cockrell, No. Civ.A. 3:01CV-2280, 2003 WL 21488632, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2003) (noting that state
offered to make Dr. Grigson available as forensic psychiatric expert)).
115. This result was derived from searching for “<(“dr. james grigson”) (james
+2 grigson) & da(aft 1995 & bef 2004)>(ALLSTATES database)” on February 8,
2016; Dr. Grigson died in 2004.
116. See generally Robert Sanger, IQ, Intelligence Tests, “Ethnic Adjustments”
and Atkins, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 87 (2015). In a recent article, I re-examine Sanger’s
masterful article in the particular context of prosecutorial misconduct. See
generally Michael L. Perlin, “Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You Blind”:
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of “Ethnic Adjustments” in Death Penalty
Cases of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 1437 (2016).
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Since Atkins, some prosecution experts have begun using socalled “ethnic adjustments” to artificially raise minority
defendants’ IQ scores, making defendants who would have been
protected by Atkins and its progeny eligible for the death
penalty. [This] Article details this practice, looking at several
cases in which prosecutors successfully persuaded courts to
accept testimony that adjusted a defendant’s IQ score upward,
based on his or her race, and considers arguments put forth by
prosecutors for increasing minority defendants’ IQ scores in this
manner. 117

Sanger concludes that this practice is “logically, clinically, and
constitutionally unsound.” 118 I agree and would add only that it is
also, I believe, immoral. 119
VII. Some Prosecutors Suppress Exculpatory Psychiatric
Evidence. 120
Over the years, there have been multiple examples of cases in
which prosecutors have concealed psychiatric evidence that:
(1) might have made trial impossible; (2) might have cast doubt on
the veracity of state’s witnesses; (3) created doubt as to the
117. Sanger, supra note 116, at 87–88.
118. Id. at 146; see also Susan Unok Marks, Courts’ Elusive Search for the
Meaning of Intellectual Disability for Evaluating Atkins Claims, 26 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 347, 379 (2015) (“In reviewing the cases that have raised Atkins
claims, it is striking how many of the cases reported significantly troublesome
conditions during the defendants’ childhood.”).
119. See Jennifer Bard, Diagnosis Dangerous: Why State Licensing Boards
Should Step in to Prevent Mental Health Practitioners from Speculating Beyond
the Scope of Professional Standards, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 929, 929 (suggesting that
“state licensing boards be held responsible for assuring mental health
professionals do not testify beyond the scope of medical support or evidence” in
death penalty cases under such circumstances). On prosecutorial use of “corrupt
science” more broadly, see Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors and Corrupt Science,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2007).
120. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that “the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). The goal advanced by imposing meaningful sanctions for Brady violations
is “not merely to punish the individual prosecutor but to ensure that the
government does not feel empowered to violate constitutional mandates with
impunity.” Cynthia Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and
the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 442 (2010).
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voluntariness of the state’s witnesses; and (4) created doubt as to
the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. 121
VIII. Some Prosecutors Sanction the Improper Use of
Antipsychotic Medications at Trial so as to Make Defendants
Appear Less Remorseful and as to Make Them Less Capable of
Consulting with Counsel.
In 1992, the Supreme Court held, in Riggins v. Nevada, 122 that
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to a
competent defendant proffering an insanity defense violated his
due process rights. 123 Although the Court did not set down a brightline test articulating the state’s burden in sustaining forced
121. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C.L. REV. 693, 701 n.42 (1987) (discussing
Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963), which addressed suppression of
evidence that both defendants were legally incompetent to stand trial); Powell v.
Wiman, 287 F.2d 275, 278 n.17 (5th Cir. 1961) (addressing evidence of mental
illness of key witness, including three different hospitalizations in mental
institutions); Wallace v. State, 501 P.2d 1036, 1037 (Nev. 1972) (noting a
psychiatric report revealing defendant’s mental illness that was relevant both to
voluntariness of confession and to degree of guilt). Sanctions in any Brady case
are virtually nonexistent. See Rosen, supra, at 730 (analyzing five-year study of
Brady violations and finding only nine disciplinary actions taken); see also Kuo &
Taylor, supra note 90, at 704–05, (discussing research reported in Rosen). A 1999
investigation by the Chicago Tribune identified 381 homicide cases nationally in
which Brady violations produced conviction reversals. Keenan et al., supra note
63, at 220 (discussing Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor,
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi020103trial1,0,479347.story (last visited June 14, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review)). In not a single case was a prosecutor publicly
sanctioned. Id.
There are similar patterns in other nations as well. See generally Rosen, supra
note 121, at 714 n.116; Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability, Factual Innocence
and the Death Penalty, in CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN ASIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PAVING THE WAY FOR THE FUTURE 21 (Korean Institute of Criminology ed. 2014).
On the possible existence of an Eighth Amendment right to discovery in capital
cases as a means of dealing with Brady violations, see Sanjay K. Chhablani,
Beyond Brady: An Eighth Amendment Right to Discovery in Capital Cases, 38
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 423 (2014).
122. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 110, at
§ 8-7.2 (discussing this case).
123. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137–38. An estimated two-thirds of prisoners and
40% of jail inmates with mental disabilities have reported taking prescription
medication. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2015).
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drugging of a detainee at trial, the Court found that this burden
would be met had the state demonstrated either (1) medical
appropriateness, and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
“essential for the sake of Riggins’s own safety or the safety of
others,” or (2) a lack of less intrusive means by which to obtain an
adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. 124 The Court
found that the use of drugs below may well have impaired the
defendant’s trial rights, as their side effects might have affected
not just the defendant’s outward appearance, but also “the content
of his testimony . . . , his ability to follow the proceedings, or the
substance of his communication with counsel.” 125
At trial, Riggins had been medicated with 800 milligrams of
the drug Mellaril, considered to be within the “toxic range”; 126 an
expert in the case testified that that was sufficient dosage with
which to “tranquilize an elephant.” 127 In his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy went further than the majority by focusing on the
potential impact of these drugs’ side effects on a defendant’s fair
trial rights, since the drugs could alter his demeanor in a way that
“will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom,”
and render him “unable or unwilling” to assist counsel. 128 If the
medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react to the
proceedings and to demonstrate “remorse or compassion,” the
prejudice suffered by the defendant can be especially acute at the
sentencing stage. 129 Here, Justice Kennedy relied on the research
of William Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam, whose research
demonstrated that assessment of remorse might be the dispositive
factor to jurors in death penalty cases. 130
Think of the range of issues that must be considered in such a
case:
• At the Symposium at which a version of this Article was
given, Lloyd Snook, Joseph Giarratano’s trial lawyer, told
124. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135–36.
125. Id. at 137.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 143 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 142.
129. Id. at 144.
130. Id. (citing William Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life
or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 1, 51–53 (1988)).
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how the excessive amounts of Thorazine given to the
defendant left him “drooling.” 131 Dora Klein has noted
astutely that “jurors cannot reasonably be expected to
disregard the days or perhaps weeks that they observed the
defendant sitting before them sedated and drooling, or
agitated and twitching.” 132
In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the demeanor of
defendants with intellectual disabilities “may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes.” 133 In his concurrence in Riggins, Justice Kennedy
focused on this issue extensively: “assessments of character
and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be
determinative of whether the offender lives or dies.” 134
Some eleven years after Riggins, the Supreme Court
weighed the right to refuse treatment balance in cases
involving an incompetent defendant, in Sell v. United

131. Presentation by Lloyd Snook, Washington and Lee Law Review
Symposium (Feb. 6, 2016).
132. Dora Klein, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: The Case Against
Administering Involuntary Medications to a Defendant During Trial, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 165, 207 (2002).
Whether or not a defendant “drools” has acquired totemic significance in these
sorts of cases. In the trial of Andrew Goldstein for the murder of Kendra Webdale
(after whom New York’s outpatient commitment statute, “Kendra’s Law,” was
named), jurors, who initially rejected Goldstein’s insanity defense, “reported
crediting testimony that Goldstein did not froth at the mouth or drool, and
considered his lack of drooling significant to their responsibility determination.”
See Amanda Pustilnik, Prisons of the Mind: Social Value and Economic
Inefficiency in the Criminal Justice Response to Mental Illness, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 217, 248 (2005); see also Life Is In Mirrors, supra note 11, at 334–
35 (“Jurors often expect people with mental retardation to be extremely low
functioning and may not be expecting a quiet, mild-mannered individual. When
the defendant fails to exhibit any stereotypical behaviors (such as drooling,
giggling, smiling with a vacant appearance, rocking), jury members may think
that the mental retardation defense is untrue or unwarranted.”). For a case
example in which the prosecutor—with impunity—mocked the defendant’s
mental illness claim in a death penalty case, see Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d
338 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Sheppard v. Robinson, 132 S. Ct. 2751
(2012); see, e.g., Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 30–64, Sheppard v. Bagley, No.
09-3472 (6th Cir. 2010), ECF No. 57; Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant,
Sheppard v. Bagley, No. 09-3472 (6th Cir. 2010), ECF No. 72.
133. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
134. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992).
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States, 135 and the Court stressed the need to inquire as to
whether such drugs would interfere with the defendant’s
ability to aid his counsel in preparation of trial. 136 In a
series of books and articles, I have written about the impact
of sanism and pretextuality 137 on the way defendants with
mental disabilities are treated in the criminal justice
system. 138 An overmedicated defendant—appearing bored,
apathetic, remorseless—is precisely the sort of defendant
that jurors will more likely sentence to death. 139
Thus, for almost twenty-five years, prosecutors have been on
notice that the administration of such medications to defendants
at their trials may violate due process. What has their track record
been? A brief inquiry into relevant cases suggests that Riggins has
been regularly ignored by prosecutors in a wide range of factsettings and alleged crimes. 140
135. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
136. Id. at 181; see, e.g., John Hayes, Sell v. United States: Is Competency
Enough to Forcibly Medicate a Criminal Defendant, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
657, 657 (2004); Tobias Schad, Insane in the Membrane: Arguing Against the
Forcible Medication of Mentally Ill Pre-Trial Defendants, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 351,
354–58 (2014). On the use of alternatives to medication in this context, see Adam
Dayton, United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola: When Criminal Defendants Say No to
Drugs, 7 B.Y.U.L. REV. 477, 489–91 (2012).
137. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of
other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. See, e.g., Michael L.
Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. Rev. 373, 374–75 (1992) (providing this
definition). Pretextuality refers to the way that courts accept (either implicitly or
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and
frequently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially
expert witnesses, show a “high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in
order to achieve desired ends.” Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped
Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law
Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 5 (1999) (quoting in part
Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary
Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991)).
138. See Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 94, at 17–24.
139. See Sanist Lives, supra note 19, at 242 (“[T]he most mentally disabled
persons (those regularly receiving doses of powerful antipsychotic medications)
are treated the most harshly, and . . . jurors tend to over-impose the death penalty
on severely mentally disabled defendants.”).
140. Consider some of the relevant post-Riggins cases (not all of which
involve the death penalty). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gurney, 595 N.E.2d 320,
325 (Mass. 1992) (noting reversible error to bar defendant from introducing
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IX. Some Prosecutors Seek the Imposition of the Death Penalty on
Defendants Who Are, by Any Objective Standard, Incompetent to
be Executed.
In Panetti v. Quarterman, the Supreme Court expanded the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against carrying out a death
sentence upon a prisoner whose mental illness “obstruct[ed] a
rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.” 141
The Court clarified that defendants must have the opportunity to
submit adequate expert evidence to respond to evidence on
competency “solicited by the state court” as part of the defendant’s
“constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard.” 142 In doing so,
the Court expanded upon the test initially set out in 1986 in Ford
v. Wainwright that had been interpreted to hold that competencyto-be-executed depends only on three findings: (1) that the prisoner
is aware he committed the murders, (2) that he is aware he is going
to be executed, and (3) that he is aware of the reasons the state has
given for his execution. 143
Although the Panetti Court does not state this directly, it was
at least clear in the Fifth Circuit (the federal circuit that includes
Texas, the state in which Panetti was convicted) that the Ford test
was no test at all. Panetti’s lawyers told this to the court in their
petition for certiorari: “Two decades have passed since this Court
decided Ford, and the Fifth Circuit has yet to find a single death
row inmate incompetent to be executed. During this same period,
the State of Texas has executed 360 people.” 144 Again, how have
evidence about impact of antipsychotic medication that he was taking at time of
trial); see also People v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Mich. App. 1997), vacated,
459 Mich. 21 (1998), reh’g denied, 549 Mich. 1228 (1998) (noting denial of defense
counsel’s request to have defendant taken off antipsychotic medication for three
days so that he could testify in unmedicated state deprived defendant of right to
fair trial); State v. Odiaga, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (Idaho 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
952 (1994), superseded by statute IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-205 (West 2012), as stated
in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 (2008) (noting that denial of defendant’s motion
to terminate antipsychotic medication violated constitution). For a later case, see
United States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp .2d 202, 248 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting
evidence relating to Sampson’s appearance at trial can be factored into the
cumulative prejudice analysis, relying on Riggins).
141. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957–58 (2007).
142. Id. at 952.
143. Id. at 956.
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Panetti, No. 06-6407, 2006 WL 3880284
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prosecutors behaved in the wake of Panetti? 145 Although the
Panetti prosecutorial misconduct intersection has not been
extensively explored, the case of Cole v. Roper 146 should make it
clear that Panetti is in no way a panacea for the problems raised
here.
X. The Outcomes
Prosecutors’ associations have been globally indifferent to
efforts to sanction those who violate the law and the spirit of justice
in such cases. 147 A startling exception to this global indifference
came in the form of a Supreme Court amicus brief filed by six
former Tennessee prosecutors, who argued that the behavior of the
trial prosecutor in the case of Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman had crossed
a line that had “taint[ed] all members of the Tennessee bar.” 148 But
this action by prosecutors is a lonely exception. 149

at *26.
145. Panetti has been cited favorably in a case involving egregious Brady
violations. See Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009)
The prosecutor’s conduct at issue here, then, is akin to a fraud on the
federal habeas courts; that is, the prosecutor took affirmative actions
to conceal his tacit agreement with the state’s key witness until it was
too late, procedurally, for Mr. Douglas to use that undisclosed
agreement successfully to challenge his capital conviction.
146. 783 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the state’s incorrect
decision of due process claims did not result in an unreasonable application of
Panetti, and that state court’s failure to hold a more formal hearing regarding
competency to be executed did not warrant habeas relief).
147. See, e.g., Steve Weinberg, Turning on Their Own: A Group of Former
Prosecutors Cites a Colleague’s Pattern of Misconduct, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(June 26, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2003/06/26/5522/turningtheir-own (last updated June 18, 2016) (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) ) [hereinafter
Turning on Their Own] (noting a unique amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of a
Tennessee death row inmate (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. Id.
149. See id. (discussing the actions of these Tennessee prosecutors); see also
Steve Weinberg, Unbecoming Conduct: A Prosecutor in Nashville Is Accused of
Manipulating Evidence to Send a Defendant to Death Row, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.–
Dec. 2003, at 29 (discussing denial of certiorari in Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S.
88 (2002)). See generally Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Tenn.
1998) (noting that prosecutor’s misconduct included suppression and
misrepresentation of evidence of defendant’s major mental illness);.
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Judicial sanction is rare as well. 150 In a study of 707 cases in
which California courts explicitly found prosecutorial misconduct,
the offending prosecutors were “almost never discipline[d].” 151 In
his exhaustive study of cases involving prosecutorial misconduct
in jury argument, Professor Bennett Gershman (a former
prosecutor) was able to find only one decision in which such
conduct resulted in discipline. 152 Another study of 318 cases
involving homicide defendants who received new trials because of
prosecutorial misconduct found that one prosecutor was fired (but
was reinstated on appeal), another received a thirty day in-house
suspension, and a third’s license was suspended for thirty days for
other misconduct in the case; not one of the 315 others received any
kind of sanction from a state disciplinary agency. 153 Perhaps this
should not be surprising as, remarkably, the legal profession has
never addressed the unique ethical issues that arise in death
penalty cases. 154
Thoughtful critics have carefully crafted potentially
ameliorative recommendations, but there has been neither a
response from organized prosecutors’ associations nor by the
organized judiciary. 155 Consider this wide range of suggestions
150. On why judges are “disincentivized” from reporting prosecutorial
misconduct, see Keenan et al., supra note 63, at 210–11.
151. Compare Lara Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in
Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 399 n.12
(2011) (quoting Northern California Innocence Project, Preventable Error: A
Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997–2009 (2010)), with Keenan
et al., supra note 63, at 205 (asserting that the Supreme Court believes that
“disciplinary procedures effectively deter prosecutorial misconduct”).
152. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393,
445 (1992) (reporting the results of his study); accord Christopher Slobogin, The
Death Penalty in Florida, 1 ELON L. REV. 17, 33 (2009) (noting that “in virtually
none of the [Florida] cases in which prosecutors misbehaved were disciplinary
measures taken” (footnote omitted)).
153. COYNE & ENZEROTH, supra note 47, at 553–54. Two were indicted and
both indictments were dismissed pre-trial.
154. See generally Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, supra
note 65, at 400.
155. On the contrary, a report done by the California District Attorneys’
Association argues, vainly, “innocent prisoners are not being executed,” and
“claims of wrongful convictions are based on misleading, exaggerated data.”
Compare CA. DIST. ATTY’S ASSOC., PROSECUTORS’ PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA’S
DEATH PENALTY 27 (2003), http://www.cjlf.org/deathpenalty/DPPaper.pdf, with
Paul C. Giannelli, Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on Forensic Science, 35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 627, 627 (2001) (“When DNA evidence was first offered at trial,
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made by Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier and his colleagues, by
Center Director for the ACLU of California Center for Advocacy &
Policy Natasha Minsker, Professor Myrna Raeder, Professor H.
Mitchell Caldwell, and students in the Yale Law School
Prosecutorial Ethics and Accountability Project:
•

•

prosecutor offices should reevaluate their training
programs for new and long-time capital attorneys
regarding ethics in capital cases and how to deal
with pressures to achieve convictions and death
sentences;
such offices should responsibly evaluate their
methods for internal sanctioning of lawyers who
behave improperly in capital cases;

•

courts, prosecutor offices, and ethics committees
should together ensure that prosecutors who
egregiously violate ethics rules in capital cases are
not allowed to act as counsel in further capital cases;

•

states should pass laws mandating that the death
penalty may not be sought a second time against a
defendant when a prosecutor previously committed
egregious misconduct such as intentionally
withholding exculpatory evidence; 156

•

the “harmless error” analysis should not be applied
to evaluate misconduct in death penalty cases;

•

prosecutors should not charge death for the purpose
of securing a plea bargain to a lesser sentence;

•

prosecutors should provide open-file discovery and
scrupulously disclose to the defense any and all
information that might be beneficial to the defense,
either during the guilt or the penalty phase;

•

prosecutors should not seek to mislead the jury about
the legal requirements for finding in favor of death
or about the legal consequences of their decision not
to find for death;

it was vigorously championed by most prosecutors. When the same evidence was
offered by the defense, however, other prosecutors objected.” (footnote omitted)).
156. See Kirchmeier et al., supra note 101, at 1382–84. On the issue of
training, see The Lone Miscreant, supra note 14, at 727–28 (discussing selfregulation of prosecutors).
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•

prosecutors should refrain from public comments
that could prejudice the defendant in a death penalty
case; 157

•

prosecutorial offices should be required to adopt
written policies governing the introduction of
forensic and other expert testimony;

•

prosecutors presenting specific expertise would be
required to obtain training in such disciplines;

•

prosecutorial offices should implement procedures
through which one or more prosecutors with
experience in forensic or social science evidence
review the introduction of all evidence whose
reliability has been questioned; 158

•

state bar associations must promulgate effective and
enforceable rules defining the ethical obligations of
prosecutors; 159 and

•

states should create independent commissions for
prosecutorial oversight. 160

But again, there have been few actions voluntarily taken by
prosecutors to implement any of these suggestions. In short,
prosecutors have virtually carte blanche authority to misinform
jurors, to play to irrational and sanist fears, and to employ
unscrupulous experts. There are virtually no voices raised in
opposition, and courts are largely compliant with this state of
affairs.
XI. Therapeutic Jurisprudence 161

157. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 65, at 399–
402.
158. Raeder, supra note 102, at 1450–51.
159. See Keenan et al., supra note 63, at 241–42 (“The ABA should begin a
dialogue with states and the Department of Justice about expanding Rule 3.8 to
more completely address the unique ethical challenges that face
prosecutors . . . These responsibilities are not adequately addressed in the Model
Rules . . . .”).
160. See generally H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct,
Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 98–101 (2013).
161. Portions of the following section are adapted from Michael L. Perlin,
“Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The International Human Rights
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One of the most important legal theoretical developments of
the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ). 162 Therapeutic jurisprudence
presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and
legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can
have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. 163 It asks
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be
reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinating due process principles. 164 The law’s use of “mental
health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot]
impinge upon justice concerns,” 165 and inquiries into therapeutic

and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46
TEX. TECH L. REV. 301 (2013), and Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His
Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have
Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014). Further, it distills the work of the author over
the past two decades, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993).
162. For works discussing this legal theory, see generally, e.g., DAVID B.
WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990);
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler,
Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); PERLIN
& CUCOLO, supra note 110, §§ 2-6, at 2-43–2-66. Wexler first used the term in a
paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David
B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32–33 (1992) (using the term
“therapeutic jurisprudence”).
163. Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”:
How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?,
42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009) [hereinafter His Brain Has Been Mismanaged
]; see also, Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton &
Kate Peterson eds., 2006) (for a transnational perspective).
164. Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”:
Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of
Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 508–
11 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even Say
What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, Best
Friend].
165. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of
Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also, e.g., David Wexler,
Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPL. & PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179, 184 (1996).

1540

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2016)

outcomes “does not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil
rights and civil liberties.” 166
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to
dignity. 167 Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs”: voice,
validation, and voluntariness, 168 arguing:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must
have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision
maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely
listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the
litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from
a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are
more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a
sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in
the very process that engendered the end result or the very
judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate
healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In
general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 169

In a recent article about dignity and the civil commitment
process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum
embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and
focus specifically on this issue of voice: “When procedures give
people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given
respect, decisions are explained to them, their views taken into
166. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000);
Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline:” Mental
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775,
782 (1998).
167. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
MODEL 161 (2005). On dignity in the sentencing process generally, see MENTAL
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 214–15.
168. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L.
REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the importance of “voice,” see also Ian Freckelton,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and
Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 588 (2008).
169. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95
(2002). See generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (2010) (advocating the use of therapeutic jurisprudence to
integrate psychology, mental health, and other related enterprises to enrich and
shape the law).
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account, and they substantively feel less coercion.” 170 How does
this “play out” in the context of what I am discussing in this paper?
Sadly, little has been written about the death penalty from a
TJ perspective. 171 Bruce Winick has argued persuasively that TJ
supports a policy that prohibits the execution of seriously mentally
ill offenders as not adequately serving the goals of retribution and
deterrence. 172 Also, Cynthia Adcock—a law professor who spent
thirteen years representing death penalty defendants—listed
those affected by the process: lawyers, prosecutors, experts, jurors,
trial judges and court staff, family members, friends, prison
employees, the governor, ministers, witnesses to the execution,
and “finally, the inevitable scores who stand outside the prison
gates and elsewhere in protest of the execution and others who just
mourn the death of another prisoner killed by their
government,” 173 and she concluded that there was evidence of
“psychological devastation caused by the death penalty on those
who the lawmakers do not intend to be the target of death penalty
laws.” 174 But there is so much more to consider.
Think of the issue of medicating incompetent death row
prisoners so as to make them competent to be executed; this use of
state-sanctioned psychiatry violates dignity and also delegitimizes
the process involved, making that process anti-therapeutic not
solely for those incompetent persons facing death, but for all
170. Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness:
Rethinking Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 51 (2015).
171. On the related question of the TJ implications of the death penalty for
the families of victims, see Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit,
Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A
Two State Comparison, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2012). On TJ and the victims of crime
in general, see Antony Pemberton & Sandra Reynaers, The Controversial Nature
of Victim Participation: Therapeutic Benefits in Victim Impact Statements,
Justice: An Introduction, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND VICTIM
PARTICIPATION 233 (Edna Erez et al. eds., 2011).
172. Bruce Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty
Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785,
854–58 (2009).
173. Cynthia F. Adcock, The Collateral Anti-Therapeutic Effects of the Death
Penalty, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 289, 291–92 (2010).
174. Id. at 293. See David C. Yamada, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Practice of Legal Scholarship, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 121, 138–39 (2010) (discussing
Adcock’s work, and noting that Adcock “reminds us of emotional consequences of
law and legal systems that are all too easy to ignore”).
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subject to the same penalty. 175 Think of the ways that prosecutors
play on the fears of and exploit the ignorance of jurors in these
cases; these actions rob defendants of dignity and deny them a
voice. 176 Similarly, prosecutors who call expert witnesses knowing
that the “scientific bases” of the experts’ testimony is baseless
(perhaps, at this point in time, fraudulent) similarly invalidate the
legitimacy of the proceedings in question. 177
Think further of the issues related to adequacy of counsel. As
stated flatly by Judge Juan Ramirez and Professor Amy Ronner,
“the right to counsel is . . . the core of therapeutic
jurisprudence.” 178 “Any death penalty system that provides
inadequate counsel and that, at least as a partial result of that
inadequacy, fails to insure that mental disability evidence is
adequately considered and contextualized by death penalty
decision-makers, fails miserably from a therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective.” 179 If counsel in death penalty cases fails to meet
constitutional minima, it strains credulity to argue that such a
practice might comport with TJ principles. TJ is the perfect
mechanism “to expose [the law’s] pretextuality” 180 because this
pretextuality is clear in the death penalty context.
In short, our entire capital punishment system mocks those
principles of TJ that we must embrace if we are to have a coherent
and legitimate criminal procedure system.
175. I touch on this briefly in Michael L. Perlin, “Good and Bad, I Defined
These Terms, Quite Clear No Doubt Somehow”: Neuroimaging and Competency to
Be Executed After Panetti, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 621 (2010).
176. See James W. Gunson, Comment, Prosecutorial Summation: Where Is the
Line Between “Personal Opinion” and Proper Argument?, 46 ME. L. REV. 241, 252
(1994) (observing that abusive comments by prosecutors’ remarks are
impermissible because they “engender . . . in the jury feelings of prejudice, fear,
and loathing towards the defendant; remarks are also objectionable because they
disturb the decorum of . . . the dignity of the prosecutorial office”).
177. See MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 153
(calling on bar associations to “sanction prosecutors who continue to use such
baseless, false, and potentially fatal testimony” as offered by witnesses such as
Dr. Grigson).
178. Juan Ramirez Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville’s
Tribute to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 103, 119 (2004).
179. The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden, supra note 81, at 235.
180. Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed”: Looking at Non-Institutional
Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 544
(2003).
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XII. Conclusion
The picture painted in this Article is fairly gloomy. I remain,
however, an optimist and hope that one of the most egregious of
cases, the McCollum case, 181 may signal a turn-around. There are
still many who adhere to the magical thinking that authentically
innocent individuals cannot be convicted, and certainly not in a
death penalty case, when there are allegedly so many additional
constitutional protections available to defendants—what used to
be called (and the phrase sounds faintly atavistic now) super due
process. 182
Although the Innocence Project has done a heroic, almost
other-worldly, job in putting the lie to this bromide, 183 their work
has not yet significantly shifted public attitudes, especially in the
death belt. But it is possible—again, I remain an optimist after all
these years—that McCollum (about whom there was never any
doubt as to guilt in any judge’s mind; indeed, even Justice
Blackmun assumed that he was) 184 will serve the same “shock the
conscience” role that the Birmingham church bombings, the
Triangle shirtwaist factory fire, and the Willowbrook exposures did
in other areas of social policy. 185 At least, I hope that it does.
181. See supra notes 48–59 and accompanying text (discussing the McCollum
case).
182. See Margaret Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super
Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980) (using the term “super due
process” and discussing its meaning). The California District Attorneys’
Association adheres to this magical thinking. See CA. DIST. ATTY’S ASSOC.,
PROSECUTORS’ PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA’S DEATH PENALTY 27 (2003),
http://www.cjlf.org/deathpenalty/DPPaper.pdf (discussing prosecutors’ thoughts
and conclusions concerning California’s death penalty).
183. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 31, at 230 n.68 (revealing that the vast
amount of innocent prisoners are convicted after false confessions).
184. See A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice, supra note 58 (“It was once the
case that McCollum was held out to . . . the Supreme Court, as the very worst of
the worst, deserving of death because of the heinousness of his crimes.”).
185. See Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 66 n.10 (1991)
(citing PHILLIP FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE POLITICS AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, 1900–09, at
21 (2d ed. 1973), which addressed the death of workers in the Triangle Shirtwaist
factory fire of 1911 that led to the appointment of the New York State Factory
Investigating Commission); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 33–34 (1985)
(noting that the 1963 church bombing killed four youths in Birmingham, Alabama
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Certainly, if we incorporate a mode of therapeutic
jurisprudential analysis, that will make ameliorative change more
likely. If TJ principles are applied to questions that revolve around
adequacy of counsel, and the use of medication so as to make
defendants “competent to be executed,” then we will have taken
major steps towards bringing about this change. 186 I have written
often about how TJ is the best possible tool to “expose pretextuality
and strip bare the law’s sanist facade” in other areas of the law; 187
I believe that this is just as so in the context of the death penalty. 188
But until then, we are faced with the reality that prosecutors in
the cohort of cases that I discuss here violate the law and the codes
of ethics with impunity, and are often rewarded for it, which is a
state of affairs about as contrary to the principles of TJ as one can
imagine.
Although the legacy of the Giarratano case is still uncertain at
best, I can certainly say with confidence that mental disability
makes the whole notion of meaningful post-conviction review for
the death penalty defendant utterly pretextual, especially in the
cases of defendants who have no counsel and proceed pro se. 189
and served as the impetus for the passage of civil rights laws); see also Michael L.
Perlin, “Chimes of Freedom”: International Human Rights and Institutional
Mental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 425 (2002)
(discussing how conditions at Willowbrook State School were exposed to a
stunned nation some thirty years ago by the then-fledgling investigative reporter
Geraldo Rivera).
186. I do not believe that the death penalty can ever be a valid penalty. But,
as long as a majority of the Supreme Court has seen fit to not return to the
teachings of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (declaring death penalty, as
implemented, unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments),
it is essential, I believe that the process be as “valid” as possible, using that word
in the way used by Professor Ronner. See supra note 169 (“If that litigant feels
that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the
litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of validation.”).
187. See, e.g., Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 164, at 751 (applying TJ
principles to right to refuse treatment law); His Brain Has Been Mismanaged,
supra note 163, at 915 (applying those principles to insanity defense law); Michael
L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You Might Have Drugs at Your Command”:
Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the
Perspectives of International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 381, 399 n.104 (2015) (applying those principles to the law
governing the drugging of defendants incompetent to stand trial).
188. On the pretextual use or misuse of social science data in death penalty
cases, see Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 19, at 263.
189. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of
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Again, I believe this all starts at the doorstep of the prosecutor and
of the judge who closes his or her eyes and ears to the stench of
prosecutorial misconduct. The narrator of Changing of the Guards,
the Dylan song that inspired my title, says, in the stanza in
question, “I stepped forth from the shadows.” 190 Prosecutors who
misbehave in death penalty cases involving defendants with
mental disabilities and the judges who sanction that behavior
have, traditionally, stayed in the “shadows.” I hope this article, to
some extent, helps bring them out.

defendants with certain disabilities, or on certain medications, to meaningfully
participate in their own defense).
190. Dylan, supra note 20.

